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In a criminal justice system permeated by guilty pleas,' the
determination of the sentence imposed, rather than the determination of
guilt, is often the most critical phase of evaluation in the criminal justice
* Professor, Department of Law & Justice, Trenton State College, Trenton, New
Jersey.
1. See GEORGE F. COLE, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 417 (6th
ed. 1992); CHARLES H. WHrrEHEAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
625 (1993) (concluding that 90-95 % of all cases are resolved through plea agreements).
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process.' The key document at both the sentencing phase and during the
correctional process is the defendant's presentence investigation report

(PSIR).3

The PSIR, prepared by a probation officer, presents the

sentencing judge with relevant facts about the defendant and is intended
to portray the defendant as a "living human being." 4 The PSIR has a

significant influence not only on the sentence a judge may impose, but also
on a defendant's correctional and post-incarceration life. The PSIR aids
the probation officer in supervision efforts, and assists the Federal Bureau

of Prisons in classifying defendants for security purposes. 5

When a

defendant is in prison, the PSIR may be used to determine a defendant's

"visitation, mail privileges, sentence credit, work study, and transfers." 6
The PSIR is designed to be an objective and relatively exhaustive

summary of a defendant's life and criminal history.' If used properly, it
is a document that can improve the efficiency and fairness of the criminal
justice system. Many amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (most recently in December, 1994) have permitted greater
2. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that
the prior statements of witnesses testifying at a sentencing hearing must be disclosed to
the defense under The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994)).
3. See Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An
EmpiricalandLegalAnalysisof the Disclosureof PresentenceReportsin FederalCourts,
93 HARV.L.REV. 1613, 1616 (1980). See generally John C.Coffee Jr., The Future of
Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualizationof Justice, 73 MICH.
L.REV. 1361, 1369 (1975); Keith A.Findley & Meredith J.Ross,Access,Accuracy and
Fairness:The FederalPresentenceInvestigationReport Under Julian and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 837 (1989); Christina Rush & Jeremy Robertson,
PresentenceReports: The Utility of Information to the SentencingDecision, 11 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 147 (1987) (discussing in detail relevant issues surrounding the PSIR);
Note, A Proposalto EnsureAccuracy in PresentenceInvestigationReports, 91 YALE L.J.
1225 (1982).
4. Fennell & Hall, supra note 3, at 1627 (quoting J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A
HUMAN PROCESS 246-47 (1971)).
5. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs., THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 1

(Jan. 5,1978; revised Sept. 25, 1978, 1984, 1987 & 1992). Section 604 of Title 28
U.S.C. (1994) defines the duties of the director of the Administrative Office. Generally,
the Administrative Office supervises the daily clerical and personnel matters of the
courts, but under § 604(a)(9) of Title 28, Congress has vested the Office with the
responsibility of establishing pretrial services pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3152 (1994). The
pretrial services that Congress has mandated are varied and include such responsibilities
as collecting information regarding pretrial release, supervising persons in custody,
informing the court and United States Attorney of violations of pretrial release, and
developing a system to monitor bail activities. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1)-(13) (1994).
6. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 841.
7. Id.
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disclosure of PSIRs to defendants, thereby ensuring greater scrutiny and
accuracy of the information therein.' Presumably, the more accurate the
PSIR, the fairer the decisions informed by the PSIR's contents will be.
However, with the abolition of parole for all defendants whose offenses
were committed on or after November 1, 1987, 9 and the establishment of
the Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Commission's
Guidelines,"0 judges have lost much of their sentencing discretion, giving
rise to the perception that judges need less guidance in their sentencing
decisions." The perceived value of the PSIR has eroded accordingly: the
narrower the latitude of discretion of the sentencing judge, the less
relevant the PSIR becomes. The less value ascribed to the PSIR, the
greater the potential tolerance for procedural hurdles that may foster
inaccurate or incomplete PSIRs.
Nonetheless, to the defendant seeking individualized treatment, the
PSIR is important. Judges may still rely on the PSIR to determine proper
sentences within the latitude permitted by the sentencing guidelines. 2
For defendants facing incarceration, restrictions on a judge's ability to
temper a statutorily prescribed sentence are exceedingly important. At the
very least, the PSIR can influence a defendant's prison security level and
relationship with social service agencies upon release. 3
This Article discusses how Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which governs PSIRs, could be amended to ensure greater
fairness and efficiency in sentencing and correctional processes through
more open disclosure of the PSIR before and during the sentencing
hearing, thereby providing protections similar to those contained in pretrial
hearings. The current absence of procedural safeguards and the possible
8. Id. at 839.
9. See id. at 842 n.24.
10. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, & 995 (1994) (establishing the United States
Sentencing Commission, directing the Commission to create sentencing guidelines, and

outlining the powers of the Commission). For an explanation of the sentencing guidelines
and their source, see infra note 38.
11. Sections 991, 994, and 995 (a)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code operate
to "consolidate ... the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge and the
Parole Commission ... by creating the United States Sentencing Commission to devise
guidelines to be used for sentencing" and to abolish the Parole Commission. Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
12. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 845.
13. See United States v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
the defendant should be permitted to challenge his PSIR on a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (habeas corpus for federal prisoners), because a possible error in the PSIR could
not have been discovered in time for the defendant's direct appeal or a motion under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (motion to correct the sentence)).
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concealment of diagnostic opinions, sentencing recommendations, and
sources of crucial information creates an unnecessary environment of
arbitrariness in the justice system. This article will demonstrate that
despite many salutary amendments to Rule 32, the PSIRs can still contain
many inaccuracies. Defendants still do not have adequate access to the
reports in their entirety, nor, at times, a meaningful opportunity to correct
inaccurate information in them. It is important to note that while Rule 32
applies to federal cases, the guidelines it provides for use of the PSIR are
equally applicable to state cases, as federal law often serves as a model for
state law.
II. THE INHERENT INADEQUACIES OF RULE 32

"The principal problem with the [PSIR]" is its "potential for
introducing inaccurate or misleading information" into "a setting
[sentencing hearing] virtually free of trial-like procedural safeguards." 4
Indeed, a defendant's right to due process is violated when he or she is
sentenced on the basis of "materially untrue" information.'" Although
probation officers do attempt to verify data in the PSIR by personally
contacting interested parties and by basing their conclusions on such
documents as letters, facsimiles, and certified statements, and by clearly
labeling "all unverified information,"' 6 some "available data on the
federal probation officer's work load indicates that little, if any,
verification of information is possible." 7 .
The importance of disclosure of the PSIR to the defendant and the
correlation between disclosure and accuracy is acknowledged in the
legislative history of Rule 32. Before the 1989 amendment to Rule 32,18
a judge only had to disclose the PSIR to the defendant "[a]t a reasonable
14. Fennell & Hall, supra note 3, at 1622.
15. Townsendv. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (holding that a defendant's right
to due process of law was violated when the defendant was sentenced on the basis of
misleading information or inaccurate assumptions about his prior criminal record).
16. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs., supra note 5, at 3.
17. Rafael Guzman, Defendant'sAccess to PresentenceReportsin FederalCriminal

Courts, 52 IOWA L. REV. 161, 167 (1966). Current data indicates that the probation
officer's caseload is "huge" and "oversized," averaging 115 cases and sometimes
reaching 300 cases. COLE, supra note 1, at 641-42.
18. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) (amended in 1989 to mandate disclosure of the
PSIR at least 10 days prior to sentencing, instead of within a "reasonable time" before
sentencing).
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time before imposing the sentence. " 19 However, even before the 1989
amendment, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts had
explicitly encouraged judges to disclose the PSIR "sufficiently prior to the
imposition of sentence to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to be

informed of its contents and prepare a challenge to alleged factual
inaccuracies."' Also, in notes accompanying the many amendments to
Rule 32, the advisory committee2' has advocated greater openness
surrounding the PSIR in sentencing because "the sentence imposed on the

defendant is the most critical stage of criminal proceedings."2
Despite such admonitions and salutary changes to Rule 32, a more

meaningful disclosure of the PSIR to the defendant before sentencing is
still necessary to correct factual errors. The permissible timetable of
disclosure of PSIRs exacerbates the problem of the potential inclusion of
inaccurate information.
For example, under the current Rule 32,
probation officers must provide defendants and their attorneys with the
PSIR "[n]ot less than 35 days before the sentencing hearing."'

However, if defendants timely notify probation officers of their objections

to the PSIR, 24 the defendants may receive a revised PSIR (which may

merely note and dismiss their objections)' as late as "7 days before the
sentencing hearing."'

With these time constraints, defendants cannot

19. Fed R. Crim. P. 32 (1983). For a summary of the amendments to Rule 32, see
the advisory committee's notes; see also United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486
U.S. 1, 14 (1988). In Julian, two prison inmates requested, but were denied, copies of
the PSIR. In granting the inmates' requests, the Court's decision in Julian virtually
mandated changes to Rule 32. The Court held that the federal PSIR is an agency record
of the United States Parole Commission and, under the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1994), is, thus, subject to disclosure to the individual who is the focus of
the PSIR (i.e., the defendant). Id. at 14. Rule 32 now largely obviates the need for
inmates to request copies of the PSIR, because PSIRs are now provided to defendants
before sentencing. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(6)(A)-(C).
20. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs., supra note 5, at 2.
21. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee's notes (advocating as
much disclosure to the defendant as possible, while recognizing the increased burdens
placed upon judges).
22. FED. R. CRni. P. 32 advisory committee's note (1993 amendment).
23. FED. R. CPlM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
24. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B) requires the probation officer to prepare "an
addendum setting forth any unresolved objections, the grounds for those objections, and
the probation officer's comments on the objections." Id.
26. FED. R. CRLM. P. 32(b)(6)(C).
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mount effective challenges to inaccurate PSIRs because sentencing
hearings are not fully adversarial.2 7
Although nothing in Rule 32 prevents a court from ordering disclosure
of the PSIR more than thirty-five or seven days before sentencing,28
judges may not be inclined to use their discretion to order earlier
disclosure. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that judges rarely use
their discretion to order earlier disclosure of the PSIR. For example, in
a survey conducted in 1980, before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(when PSIRs had an arguably greater impact on the imposition of
sentence), when judges were required to disclose PSIRs at a "reasonable
time" before sentencing,29 at least twenty-seven federal district courts
(thirty percent of the courts in the survey) disclosed the PSIR only on the
day of sentencing. 30 Eight percent of the actual physical disclosures of
the PSIRs occurred in the courtroom,31 where reading may have been
"hurried and careless,"32 or in the judge's chamber where a "defense
attorney's desire to make a detailed examination [of the PSIR may have
been hampered]. " '
Moreover, defense attorneys were allowed
possession of the PSIR only for a short time, although fifty-five percent
of the courts surveyed permitted "extensive" note taking.'
The amendments to Rule 32 have eliminated most of these institutional
impediments to examination and possession of the PSIR 5 Under the
current Rule, both defendants and defense attorneys are entitled to receive
and retain a copy of the PSIR before the imposition of sentence. Also, the
role of the Sentencing Commission 36 -creating uniform, but sometimes
rigid sentences-diminished the potential impact of the information
contained in the PSIR, at least with respect to the vast discretion judges
27. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding that crossexamination at a sentencing hearing is not constitutionally required).
28. See generally FED. R. C iM. P. 32(b)(6) (regarding disclosure).
29. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A) (1980). Rule 32 was amended in 1989 to require
disclosure "at least 10 days prior to sentencing." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A) (1989);
see supra note 18.
30. Fennell & Hall, supra note 3,at 1644.
31. Id. at 1646.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1645.

34. Id. at 1647.
35. See, e.g., 1983 amendment to Rule 32 (mandating automatic disclosure of the
PSIR at areasonable time before sentencing and requiring the sentencing judge to make
a finding as to controverted matter in the PSIR); 1989 amendment (mandating disclosure
of the PSIR at least ten days before sentencing).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994).
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previously exercised in weighing virtually any information in the PSIR in
their determination of discretionary sentences.
For judges and defense attorneys, the sentencing hearing is most likely
the last interaction with the defendant. From the judge's perspective, the
case of a defendant who pleads guilty is resolved, unless the sentencing
determination is reversed on appeal. Because the PSIR's role in shaping
sentences has been supplanted by the sentencing guidelines that legally
authorize their sentences, judges have fewer incentives to ensure the
accuracy of the PSIR. Since the amendments to Rule 32, lower courts
have examined the PSIR less thoroughly with regard to due process
issues. 7 Ironically, just when the amendments to Rule 32 have
mandated better access to more accurate PSIRs than ever before, judges
and attorneys may have devalued the PSIR because of the limitations upon
sentencing discretion that the sentencing guidelines engender.38
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S APPROACH TO PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORTS

The legal system's historical approach to presentence investigation
reports has been one of disinterested acceptance. Even after preliminary
changes to Rule 32, "the majority of district [courts] ... failed to develop
procedures that encourage, or sometimes even permit, the discovery of
factual errors. " " The 1983 amendment to Rule 32 mandated automatic
disclosure of the PSIR at a "reasonable time before sentencing," because
[u]nless disclosure is made sufficiently in advance of sentencing
to permit the assertion and resolution of claims of inaccuracy
prior to the sentencing hearing, the submission of additional
information by the defendant when appropriate, and informed
comment on the presentence report, the purpose of promoting
accuracy by permitting the defendant to contest erroneous
information is defeated.'
37. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 858.
38. "Sentences under the new system are based on complicated guidelines that
eliminate much of the sentencing discretion previously vested in the sentencing judge.
The new PSI[R] is tailored to provide the information and analysis necessary to
...
compute the sentencing guidelines." Id. at 842-43. The sentencing guidelines are
contained in United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines (West
Supp. 1995). The guidelines are promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1994), but
they are compiled under Title 18 and have a unique section enumeration ("lBl.18E1.3").
39. Fennell & Hall, supra note 3, at 1690.
40. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A)-(C) advisory committee's note (1983).
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The rationale behind early disclosure of the PSIR is still sound because of
the continued utility of the PSIR as a legal device, in spite of its seeming
devaluation with the advent of the sentencing guidelines and the reliance
on the PSIR as a comprehensive correctional assessment device.4'
The PSIR is used by every official and bureaucracy within the
criminal justice system. It must be prepared after every conviction, even,
for example, where a defendant convicted of escape had not been out of
prison since his last PSIR had been prepared.4' Of course, judges may
use the PSIR to fashion a sentence within the latitude of the sentencing
guidelines,4 3 and the Bureau of Prisons will use the PSIR when instituting
a correctional program.' For example, the Bureau may use the PSIR to
determine the defendant's place of incarceration with the goal of placing
the defendant in the least restrictive facility.45 Social service agencies use
the PSIR to administer treatment programs and reintegrate the defendant
into the community.' Some of the information contained in the PSIR,
such as the defendant's criminal history, is used to determine sentencing
under the sentencing guidelines,47 and the PSIR must be included in the
appellate record't to facilitate appeals of sentences under the
guidelines.
Despite its comprehensive use, the PSIR may still contain highly
damaging and inaccurate information. Ironically, while every earlier
41. See Schmolesky & Thorson, The Importance of the PresentenceInvestigation
Report After Sentencing, 18 Cnlm. L. BuLL. 406 (1982).

42. United States v. Turner, 905 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1990) (vacating the sentence,
concluding that a defendant should not be permitted to waive the PSIR and that Rule 32
and the sentencing guidelines must be followed strictly with regard to the preparation of
the PSIR).
43. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a)-(c) (1994); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (each
permitting the sentencing judge to utilize probation officers, the Bureau of Prisons,

consultants, psychologists, and psychiatrists to acquire information on which to base a
sentence).
44. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1); Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 841.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 994(q)(2) (1994).
46. See United States v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that the PSIR may affect the defendant's "relationships to various social service agencies
on... release from prison").
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(4)(B).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(2) (1994).
49. Id. § 3742(e)(2).
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substantive amendment to Rule 32-1 guaranteed increased or earlier
disclosure of the PSIR or witness statements, the 1994 amendment actually
mandated, in part, greater non-disclosure. Prior to the 1994 amendment,
for example, a judge did not have to reveal to the defendant diagnostic
opinions in the PSIR if the diagnostic opinions "in the opinion of the court
. . . might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation.""' With the
1994 amendment, Rule 32 now dictates that diagnostic opinions with
serious disruptive potential "must" be excluded from the PSIR.5 The
judge may rely on such excluded opinions in imposing a sentence, so long
as the judge merely "summarizes" them for the defendant and gives
"defen[se] counsel a reasonable opportunity to comment on that
information. "3
Before the 1994 amendment, Rule 32 read as though sentencing
judges, in their discretion, could disclose to the defendant potentially
sensitive information.' With the 1994 amendment to Rule 32, the entire
PSIR may exclude a probation officer's recommendation on sentence55
and "must" exclude:
1. diagnostic opinions that might seriously disrupt a program of
rehabilitation;56
2. sources of information
confidentiality;' or

obtained

upon

a

promise

of

3. any other information that might result in harm, physical or
otherwise, to the defendant, or any other person.58
No one could reasonably oppose these limitations on disclosure if the
limitations would prevent a defendant from physically harming himself or
50. See, e.g., 1979 amendment (guaranteeing the production of witness statements
in Rule 32(e)); 1983 amendment (mandating automatic disclosure of the PSIR in Rule
32(c)(3)(A)); 1989 amendment (mandating disclosure of the PSIR at least ten days before
sentencing in Rule 32(c)(3)(A)).
51. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A) (1989).
52. FED. R. CiuM. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
53. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
54. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 (1989).
55. FED. R. CRM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
56. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
57. FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
58. FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(b)(5)(C).
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others. For example, it would obviously be foolhardy to reveal sources
of information to the head of an organized crime family at his sentencing.
However, the Rule 32 limitations are so broad that they could
arguably prevent the disclosure of statements from virtually all persons
with any connection to the defendant's case or past life. Neither Rule 32
nor the notes of the Rule 32 advisory committee reveal any empirical,
theoretical, or factual basis for these limitations. Yet the effect of the
limitations is to shield from scrutiny and critical evaluation the opinions,
recommendations, and statements of probation officers and mental health
professionals (mainly psychiatrists), as well as the identity of victims and
witnesses.
IV. CURRENT RULE 32 LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE

A. Disclosure of Sentencing Recommendations
Although they could be rendered by other professionals, sentencing
recommendations are most likely to be offered by probation officers as
part of the PSIR.11 Ironically, Findley and Ross conclude that "it
appears that the information most frequently withheld from the defendant
is the probation officer's sentence recommendation,"' presumably
because disclosure will "interfere with the relationship between the officer

and the defendant. "61

However, neither the "relationship" rationale nor any other rationale
adequately supports nondisclosure of sentencing recommendations.
Potential harm to the probation officer would certainly be a legitimate
rationale, but the cause and effect relationship between a recommendation
and harm is tenuous. Under the sentencing guidelines, the probation
officer's recommendation is based on a rigid formula, leaving the officer
little room for interpretation. Any final sentencing recommendation will
be largely based upon a defendant's prior criminal record and the nature
of his or her present offense,62 two determinate and relatively fixed
59. By implication, 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(9) (1994) gives probation officers with the
authority to make sentencing recommendations. Under this section, the sentencing
commission may "monitor the performance of probation officers with regard to
sentencing recommendations, including the application of the Sentencing Commission
guidelines and policy statements." Id.
60. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 863-64.
61. Such a rationale was asserted by the advisory committee to Rule 32 in the
committee's note accompanying the 1974 amendment to Rule 32. See Id. at 864 n.130.
62. John Rosecrance, Maintaining the Myth of Individualized Justice: Probation
Presentence Reports, 5 JUST. Q. 235, 240-46, 251-52 (1988). Rosecrance interviewed
37 probation officers in two medium sized California counties which were governed by
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criteria. Furthermore, it is the judge who makes the final sentencing
decision.
By nature and design, the defendant's relationship with the probation
officer is relatively cooperative-so far as a defendant allows it-and
serves partly to assist the defendant by objectively noting favorable
information. Conversely, the defendant's relationship with the prosecutor
is adversarial, and with the judge, neutral. If the defendant were inclined
to blame or harm anyone it would be the judge or prosecutor. The
probation officer is the least likely professional in the presentence process
to be perceived by the defendant as a threatening figure. A probation
officer's sentencing recommendation, based on neutral criteria, arguably
should not effect the officer's relationship with the defendant.
Moreover, the effect of probation officers' recommendations on
judges' sentencing decisions is questionable, if there is any significant
effect at all. Although their recommendations may carry greater weight
with correctional and social service agencies, one study found that it is a
prosecutor's, rather than a probation officer's, sentencing recommendation
that the judge is most likely to adopt.63 The judge and prosecutor share
a similar legal background and must work cooperatively to dispose of
cases. This relationship fosters trust, or at least reliance on each other,
In other studies,
often to the exclusion of outside professionals.
Rosecrance 4 and Cohn65 found that even if probation officers'
California's determinate sentencing policies. The officers who prepared the presentence

reports did not supervise defendants, which is the prevalent procedure in most
jurisdictions. See generally TODD CLEAR & GEORGE COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS

(1986). Rosecrance found that "[i]n the great majority of presentence investigations, the
variables of present offense and prior criminal record determine the probation officer's
final sentencing recommendation. The influence of these variables is so dominant that
other considerations have minimal influence on probation recommendations."
Rosecrance, supra at 240.
63. John Rosecrance, The Probation Officers' Search for Credibility: Ball Park

Recommendations, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 539, 550-51 (1985). However, data and
research from the 1950s through the 1970s indicate that probation officers' sentencing
recommendations were often followed, although this research focused on states and other

countries, not the federal system. I.G. Campbell, The Influence of Psychiatric PreSentence Reports, 4 INT'L J.L. & PsYCHIATRY 89, 96-97 (1981). In any event,
recommendations of probation officers may be less influential in the United States than
in other countries. Id. at 98.
64. Rosecrance, supra note 62, at 251-54. "[P]robation officers emphasize the
variables of instant offense and prior criminal record." 1d. at 251. To prevent courts
from deferring to scientists, some suggest that there should be no sentencing
recommendation. Campbell, supra note 63, at 98.
65. Yona Cohn, Recommended: No Recommendation, 48(3) FED. PROBATION 70

(1984).
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sentencing recommendations carry some weight, the effect of the
recommendations can be nullified by the defendant's present crime and
prior record.
The substance of a probation officer's sentencing recommendation
may be questionable as well. Probation officers attempt to satisfy judges
and tend to collect information that supports the officers' initial sentencing
recommendations.' They become selective in reporting information that
contradicts their recommendations, which led Cohn to recommend the
abolition of sentencing recommendations altogether.67
Of course, even if sentencing recommendations are not included in the
PSIR, probation officers, as a natural part of their duties, may
communicate with judges informally and influence them subtly. Such
communication may create a hazard for defendants, because even where
a probation officer has an ex parte contact with a judge before sentencing,
a court may be reluctant to find a violation of Rule 32.68 Thus, when
either specific written or informal oral sentencing recommendations are
not revealed to defendants, they cannot contest whether the
recommendations are supported by accurate information.
B. Disclosure of Diagnostic Opinions
Rule 32 also mandates that PSIRs exclude diagnostic opinions, if the
opinions might "seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation."69 These
opinions often consist of psychiatric reports regarding a defendant's future
dangerousness. Ironically, while psychiatric diagnostic opinions as to
dangerousness have little predictive value, their influence on the
sentencing and correctional processes can be significant.
American courts are unable or unwilling to properly use psychiatric
evidence. Traditionally, courts in common law countries, relying on a
rehabilitation model, used forensic psychiatry to provide treatment and
66. Rosecrance, supra note 62, at 252. "The type of information and observation
contained in the final presentence report is generated to support the original
recommendation decision. Probation officers do not regard defendant typings as tentative
hypotheses to be disproved through inquiry but rather as firm conclusions to be justified
in the body of the report." Id.
67. Cohn, supra note 65, at 71.
68. See United States v. Houston, 745 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
judge need not disclose information upon which he or she does not rely, such as
conversations with probation staff and recommendations made by probation officers),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1008 (1985).
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
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leniency to mentally debilitated offenders." ° This is a proper use of
psychiatry because if an offender is not mentally disabled, he is
responsible for his actions, and is thus blameworthy. The mentally
responsible offender should be sentenced based on standard factors, such
as the magnitude of the crime and the offender's prior history.
In a startling but subtle and pervasive extension of the use of
psychiatric evidence, Congress and the courts are now using psychiatry to
peer into the offender's mind to predict future dangerousness. This trend,
virtually embodied in Rule 32, results in unfairness. For example, in his
research, Campbell has inferred that "courts appear to be ready to
discount or devalue psychiatric pre-sentence recommendations for lenience
or lenience-related treatments . . . but rarely exhibit reluctance in
accepting recommendations for long custodial dispositions or treatment
recommendations that entail close security.""
Psychiatric diagnostic opinions are most harmful when courts use
them as a means to predict dangerousness, which, paradoxically, is
virtually impossible to predict, or even define. In focusing on whether
future violence can be predicted, the authors of one study simply
concluded that "the objective of [developing] a standardized, reliable,
generalized set of criteria" by which to predict dangerousness in law and
mental health "is still an elusive and distant objective. "I
There is neither general nor specific agreement on what constitutes
dangerousness.
In a World Health Organization study focused on
determining standards of dangerousness in six countries (Brazil, Denmark,
Egypt, Swaziland, Switzerland, and Thailand), researchers found little use
of standard dangerousness criteria and "no evidence that psychiatrists
agree among themselves on dangerousness assessments more readily than
nonpsychiatrists."I In his work with psychiatric reports (used by courts
70. Campbell, supra note 63, at 105-06. Defendants convicted of sexual offenses

and other serious offenses are more likely than other defendants to be referred for
psychiatric presentence reports. Id. at 92.
71. Id. at 105-06.
72. Robert Menzie, et al., The Dimensions of DangerousnessRevisited: Assessing

Forensic Predictions About Violence, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 1, 25 (1994).
Psychiatric predictions of future violence may result in an extensive rate of error.
Campbell, supra note 63, at 91. Moreover, Rule 32 does not provide any definition of
"dangerousness" or "harm." While virtually all countries employ a dangerousness
standard, the standard is poorly and haphazardly defined. See infra notes 74, 89 & 258

and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the concepts of dangerousness and
harm in the United States, see infra note 88.

73. T.W. Harding & H. Adseballe, Assessments of Dangerousness:Observation in
Six Countries. A Summary of Resultsfrom a WHO CoordinatedStudy, 6 INT'L J.L. &
PsYcHiATRY 391, 397 (1983). As a legal concept, dangerousness was incorporated into
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to assess defendants) and psychiatric evidence used in court, Shea
concluded "that psychiatrists have no particular expertise in this area

[predicting dangerousness] and that their track record in predicting
dangerousness is, on the available evidence, poor."74

Most portentously,

it has been suggested that standards of

dangerousness be deflated to extremely low levels.

Greenberg has

recommended that when evaluating a patient (i.e., a defendant)
psychiatrists

should use a low standard

for the

dangerousness

determination so that psychiatrists will not be exposed to civil liability.7'

Greenberg advocated the lower standard, even if the results are "additional
commitment hearings [and] . . . restriction [of] civil liberty .. . [and
prison] overcrowding." 7 6 Confronted with this "psychiatrist's dilemma"

(i.e., a low threshold of dangerousness that restricts civil liberties in
tension with a higher threshold that invites civil liability), Greenberg
rationalized that a low threshold standard should be implemented until
psychiatrists receive immunity from civil lawsuits for their discretionary
judgments. Greenberg concluded that "[b]y using a low threshold of

dangerousness as a basis for retaining [i.e., imprisoning] a patient...
civil and criminal law at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a "medico-legal"
concept, dangerousness determinations became accepted when physicians began testifying
as legal experts in commitment procedures for mentally ill persons. The release of
mentally ill persons from mental hospitals has diverted some of these persons into the
prison system. Id. at 391-92. In the World Health Organization study, the researchers
concluded "that dangerousness is not a single medico-legal entity, but an ill defined
notion haphazardly applied." Id. at 394.
74.

PETER SHEA, PSYCHIATRY IN COURT: THE USE(FULNESS) OF PSYCHIATRIC

136 (1993). A concept
of dangerousness cannot be agreed upon, id. at 121-25, and psychiatrists are not able to
predict dangerousness, however the concept might be defined. Id. at 131-37. At the
extremes, it may be possible for different professionals to agree generally on who is
dangerous. For example, a majority of raters (61%) may agree that a multiple murderer
who evinces suicide threats and severe psychotic illness is "extremely dangerous," while
a large majority of raters (72-86%) may agree that an offender with no history of
violence is not dangerous. Harding & Adseballe, supra note 73, at 396-97. But even
these levels of agreement about behavior at the extremes of human action seem unreliably
low. An agreement level of 61% with regard to a multiple murderer would leave
tremendous room for disagreement about any defendant who had killed fewer people, not
to mention a mere robber or burglar. A random level of agreement would be a little less
than 35%. Id. at 397.
75. Linn T. Greenberg, The Psychiatrist'sDilemma, 17 J.PSYCHIATRY & L. 381
(1989). In contrast, Campbell, supra note 63, at 96, has concluded that the role of a
psychiatrist is to moderate a defendant's punishment. Id.
76. Greenberg, supra note 75, at 386.
REPORTS AND PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE IN COURT PROCEEDINGS
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psychiatrists [will] avoid malpractice[,]..." which will encourage society
to give immunity to psychiatrists.'
The danger of such self-interested reasoning is that if Greenberg's
arbitrarily formulated threshold of dangerousness standard is used by the
criminal justice system to process a defendant, that process will involve
erroneous and unprofessional judgment. "Prominent forensic psychiatrists
almost uniformly express the view that pre-sentence reports ought to
advocate lenient, individualized treatment.""8 But because Rule 32 now
mandates that sentencing courts exclude some diagnostic opinions from
PSIRs, the defendant may have little effective opportunity to contest an
erroneous opinion (regardless of Rule 32's requirement that any
information not disclosed to the defendant but relied upon in sentencing
be summarized by the court). Even the Rule 32 advisory committee,
commenting on the 1989 amendment, "was concerned about the potential
unfairness of having confidential or diagnostic material included in
presentence reports but not disclosed to a defendant who might be
adversely affected by such material."" Inexplicably, the committee,
citing no rationale, "decided not to recommend at this time [1989] a
change in the rule."' With diagnostic opinions "that might seriously
disrupt a program of rehabilitation" now excluded from the PSIR
altogether," defendants have virtually no chance to adequately contest
these opinions-which may significantly affect their sentencing and
incarceration, but which may be unsound.'
The Rule 32 diagnostic exclusion still exists even though the Supreme
Court long ago denounced the proposition that diagnostic evaluations and
opinions in presentence investigation reports relied upon in sentencing
should be withheld from a defendant. In 1977 the Supreme Court heard
Gardner v. Florida," in which the trial court judge had sentenced the
defendant to death. The sentence was based partly on confidential
information, never disclosed to the defendant, but which was contained in
the PSIR. In arguing that the defendant was not entitled to review the
undisclosed confidential information, the State contended "that full
disclosure of presentence reports, which often include psychiatric and
77. Id. Greenberg's argument is especially dangerous, becausepsychiatrists already
tend to rate patients as more dangerous than do non-psychiatrists.
Adseballe, supra note 73, at 397.

Id. Harding &

78. Campbell, supra note 63, at 95.
79. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A) (1989) (advisory committee's note).

80. Id.
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
82. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
83. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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psychological evaluations, will occasionally disrupt the process of
rehabilitation."' Simply dismissing the State's rationale, a plurality of
the Supreme Court concluded that "[tjhe argument, if valid, would hardly
justify withholding the report from defense counsel."'
Rejecting the
defendant's death sentence, the Court held that withholding information
relied on in sentencing, which the defendant had no opportunity to
controvert or explain, denied the defendant due process of law.
C. Disclosure of Confidential Information
The amended Rule 32 mandates that the following information must
be excluded from the PSIR: "any diagnostic opinions that, if disclosed,
might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation[,] 86 sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality[,] or any other
information that, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise,
to the defendant or other persons."' Two of the historic rationales for
84. Id. at 360.
85. Id.
86. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
88. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(5)(C). Rule 32 provides judges with no standards-to
determine what types of information may cause future harm to the defendant or third
persons. The lack of any discernable standard flows from the semantical unpredictability
of future dangerousness. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
The federal sentencing guidelines do allow judges to consider a defendant's
"likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior... [tio protect the public from
further crimes."

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL §§ 4A1.1-4B1.4, Introductory Commentary to Chapter Four (West 1995).
However, courts may evaluate a defendant's past behavior rather than the probability of
his or her future dangerousness. See United States v. Gonzales, 765 F.2d 1393, 1399
(9th Cir. 1985) (court properly relied on probation officer's belief that defendant's
forgery "was a part of [defendant's] continuing criminal behavior," which included
previous sex offenses), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986). Criminal courts should
usually, like in Gonzales, base a defendant's sentence on past behavior, not possible
future actions. Yet, to some extent, future dangerousness should be considered, i.e.,
where a sentence is imposed only for retribution, and the PSIR contains information that
the defendant is a habitual offender, most likely to harm society again.
In sum, individual judges make subjective determinations of harm and use those
determinations to withhold information in the PSIR from the defendant. See Berry v.
Department of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984) (permitting the "potentially
harmful parts" of a PSIR to be withheld, but not defining "harm"). Without statutory
guidance, the semantics of harm and danger could describe virtually any kind of
deleterious behavior. For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines danger as
"jeopardy" and "exposure to loss or injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed.
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nondisclosure-unnecessary delays in sentencing and the drying up of
sources of information-have not arisen, despite prior Rule 32
amendments that expanded disclosure.8 9 Although Rule 32 requires only
that the "sources" of confidental information must be excluded from the
PSIR, 9° nothing limits who may promise confidentiality; similarly, Rule
32 does not prescribe who may receive a promise of confidentiality. With
virtually any governmental agent promising confidentiality, and any
witness demanding confidentiality, severe nondisclosure of certain material
in the PSIR could become commonplace, rather than a limited
exception. 9'
The absence of any opportunity to challenge confidential information
could result in a defendant being sentenced and later treated on the basis
of inaccurate information. As Rule 32 now reads, defendants will not
know sources of information given upon a promise of confidentiality. 2
In addition, if a judge relies upon controverted information at sentencing,
the court "must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination
that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be
taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing."' Furthermore, the
court need only append a written record of its findings to the PSIR before
it is handed over, with the defendant, to the Bureau of Prisons.' As a
1990). Harm is defined as "[t]he existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a

person resulting from any cause." Id. at 718. A leading legal encyclopedia defines
danger, in part, as an "injury, loss, pain or other evil." 25A CJ.S. Danger§ 465 &
n.48 (1966) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (page, edition, and year unknown)). In
addition, the nominative form of harm is defined as "damage, hurt, injury, [or]

misfortune," whereas the active form is defined as "to damage... hurt.., or injure."
39A CJ.S. Harm § 357 & n.44 (1976) (citing WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (page, edition, and year unknown)). Harm is a vague concept; judges may
exclude information based on the probability that the defendant or others may be harmed
in the future. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(C). Because harm is a subjective
determination, Congress needs to establish statutory guidance for these definitions, or
exclude this provision from Rule 32.

89. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 862.
90. See FED. R. CRM. P. 32.
91. Namely, information withheld includes sources of confidential information,
whether those sources are the basis of diagnostic opinions or information that, because
it could cause "harm," would also be excluded by the court. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(b)(5).
92.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).

93. FED. R. CRaM. P. 32(c)(1).
94. Id.
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result, at no point in time is the defendant able to receive a full hearing
on controverted information.9
1. Disclosure After a Guilty Verdict
It is unlikely that any confidential information, or its sources, would
remain after a defendant has been found guilty at trial. Through pretrial
discovery and trial testimony, including that elicited on crossexamination,9 6 a defendant would be apprised of all victims, witnesses,
and interested parties, as well as their prior statements.' 7 Therefore, for
these types of defendants, there is little need to withhold further
information in the sentencing phase. For example, sources of confidential
information should not be excluded from the defendant's PSIR because the
victim would have already testified at trial.98
Moreover, in Payne v. Tennessee," the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for expansive use of victim impact statements (VIS) during
the sentencing phase. Through VISs, attached to or contained within the
PSIR, the sentencing judge will be exposed to subjective and emotional
assessments of the defendant and the crime. But, while the information
in the VIS might be relevant, it might also be inaccurate. All defendants,
though, have a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
and objective information." ° Yet, because the court must only make a
written finding on controverted information relied upon in and during
sentencing,'' a defendant may receive a harsher sentence as a result of
a VIS that had more effect in court than should have been warranted.
However, because Rule 32 mandates exclusion of "sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality," 0 2 the defendant
may never have an adequate opportunity to contest the information
contained in a VIS. For example, in a survey of one hundred seventeen
state probation officers in thirty-three states, McLeod found that virtually
95. See id.
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing cross-examinationand confrontation).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (b) (1994) (mandating disclosure of the prior
statements of a witness).
98. See, e.g., FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
99. 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (permitting victim impact statements at the sentencing
phase of a capital case).
100. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948).

101. See FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(c)(1).
102. FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
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all VISs are reported to the court through the PSIR; 0 3 they are

contained in the PSIR or attached to it."° Victims, themselves, appear

at sentencing in less that eighteen percent of the cases, and they give oral

statements in just over nine percent of the cases."05

The victims'

absence or lack of participation at sentencing magnifies the importance of

the VISs, which will most frequently report the economic costs and the
seriousness of physical injuries sustained by the victims of a crime. 0 6
Additionally, victims may also send letters to sentencing judges."°

At most, the judge may only have to summarize the statements.'0"
Thus, the defendant may be sentenced, imprisoned, released, and treated

on the basis of confidential hearsay information (i.e., statements made
outside of court, but which are introduced into evidence in court, without
the testimony of the person who made the statements' 9). The defendant
will have no means by which to effectively challenge the hearsay in court.
103. Maureen McLeod, An Examinationof the Victim's Role at Sentencing: Results
of a Survey of ProbationAdministrators, 71 JUDICATURE 162, 163-64 (1987).
104. Id.
105. Id. Witnesses who are victims of violent crimes usually appear at sentencing
and look for closure. Id.
106. Id. at 164-65. The monetary loss usually relates to medical expenses, stolen
property, and destroyed property.
107. See United States v. Scalzo, 716 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that
"reliance upon hearsay and other types of admissible information to assess factors
affecting punishment is not per se improper"); United States v. Sustaita, 1 F.3d 950,
952-53 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that hearsay is admissible at sentencing, and "violates due
process only if the sentencing judge relied upon information [that] is materially false or
unreliable[;]" the standard of proof regarding United States Sentencing Commission
Guideline factors was a preponderance of the evidence). Cf. United States v. Curran,
926 F.2d 59 (lst Cir. 1991) (vacating defendant's sentence because the victim's letters
were not disclosed to the defense, when they were used in sentencing without being
summarized).
108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A), which states that "[i]f the court has
received information excluded from the presentence report under subdivision (b)(5) the
court-in lieu of making that information available-must summarize it in writing, if the
information will be relied upon in determining sentence." The court may only allow a
defendant and his or her counsel the opporunity to comment on that information before
imposing sentence. Id.
109. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
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Because hearsay evidence is admissible at sentencing, the sentencing
judge may consider allegations regarding unproven criminal activity."'

With the 1994 amendment to the PSIR, the sentencing court may "[e]xcept
for any unresolved objection under subdivision (b)(6)(B) . . . at the
hearing, accept the [PSIR] as its findings of fact.""' While such
findings may not be made if the court allows, with good cause, for the
defendant to object to "material information" or matters regarding
sentencing," 2 the permissible findings may be extremely damaging to a
defendant during the correctional or treatment process. Relatively
mundane matters at sentencing, or matters on which the court places no
weight for the purpose of sentencing, i.e., allegations of prior drug use,
are important to the Bureau of Prisons. This potentially inaccurate
criminal resume, which follows the defendant for the remainder of his or
her sentencing "career," determines the defendant's appropriate prison
classification and informs probation officers or therapists with historical
data relevant to the defendant's supervision and treatment. Yet, because
the information in the PSIR may be relatively unimportant to the court in
terms of the imposition of a proper sentence, the defense may not have a
full opportunity to adequately challenge the allegations.
One potential danger to the defendant is that the judge might weigh
inaccurate hearsay information to determine a defendant's sentence under
the sentencing guidelines without an adequate hearing by which a
defendant could challenge such information.
At a minimum, the
sentencing judge should hold a hearing on the disputed information that is
relied upon in passing sentence."'
However, another safeguard is
needed to ensure fairness to the defendant, because an additional danger
110. See United States v. Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1992) (court may
permit hearsay evidence at sentencing because the Sixth Amendment's Confrontatiofl
Clause is inapplicable); see Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1978). In Gelfuso,
the sentencing judge relied, in part, on hearsay information in the PSIR, and concluded
.that the defendants were involved in a "conspiracy... [,1
agreement or... partnership
to engage in a gambling enterprise [that] has organized gambling implications." Id. at
756 n.5. The court of appeals upheld the court's decision to rely, in part, on the hearsay
information to sentence the defendants.
111. FED. R. CRlm. P. 32(b)(6)(D).
112. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
113. See United States v. Cifuentes, 863 F.2d 1149, 1155 (3d Cir. 1988) (vacating
defendant's sentence because it was uncertain whether the trial judge relied upon disputed
hearsay information to determine the sentence; "if [the court] relies on [hearsay, the
court] should grant a hearing."); United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 875 (9th Cir.
1994) (vacating defendant's sentence because the district court "did not make an explicit
finding as to the accuracy of [defendant's] statement [, n]or did it unambiguously and
expressly state that it would not take the controverted matter into consideration when
imposing the sentence.").
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exists. In a hearing, information might be elicited through probation
officers recounting their interviews with the victims, testimony that, in
itself, is hearsay."' Even so, the advisory committee to Rule 32
contemplated that a probation officer would not testify, especially with
regard to cross-examination by the defense."' Judges who follow the
advisory committee's recommendation would then have only the PSIR to
rely upon for sentencing." 6 The defendant would have no opportunity
to adequately challenge the person who might have made an erroneous,
damaging statement that7 is quoted in the PSIR, or the person who
recorded that statement."
2. Disclosure After a Guilty Plea
It is more likely that victims and witnesses would be unknown to a
defendant and would wish to remain confidential when that defendant is
sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement. It is especially in these guilty
plea cases "in which there has usually been no development of facts at
trialfl [that] the PSI[R] is the court's primary tool for making a sentence
determination under the [sentencing] guidelines."" 8 Still, the rationale
for excluding sources of confidential information, diagnostic opinions, or
hearsay remains suspect (except where disclosure would subject a person
to possible harm)." 9 If a defendant has pleaded guilty, as opposed to
having been found guilty after trial by jury, the sentencing judge and the
criminal justice system will be in greater need of accurate information.

114. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
115. See United States v. Scalzo, 716 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding
that the sentencing judge had properly summarized the undisclosed portions of the PSIR,
and outlining the procedures the judge should take to permit the court of appeals to
analyze the judge's summarization).
116. See FED. R. CrM. P. 32(b), (c).

117. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3). Before imposing sentence, the court must
provide defendant and defendant's counsel a "reasonable opportunity to comment" on the

disputed information that the court relied upon for sentencing. Id. However, a
.reasonable opportunity to comment" in no way protects the defendant from being
sentenced based on potentially inaccurate information.
Id. (emphasis added).
Additionally, potentially inaccurate information may follow the defendant through

incarceration, probation, and rehabilitation.
118. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 843; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory
committee's note ("We believe the sentence imposed on a defendant is the most critical

stage of criminal proceedings, and is, in effect, the 'bottom-line' for the defendant,
particularly where the defendant has pled guilty.").
119. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A)-(C).
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Conversely, a trial has many procedural safeguards through which to
obtain the truth. Witnesses are subject to perjury charges for lying,"I
irrelevant information and hearsay are not admissible,' and defendants
may cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses'1 and call their own
witnesses."
The trial, therefore, provides a reservoir of relatively
reliable information from which to render a decision pertaining to guilt,
sentencing, or the correctional process.
A plea of guilty, however, guarantees no such procedural safeguards
from the sifting of facts and allegations. The comparable reservoir of
information comes from the PSIR. 24
If sources of confidential
information, diganostic opinions, or hearsay information are excluded
from the PSIR under Rule 32,'1 defendants will have virtually no
opportunity to challenge information that might provide a significant
portion of the basis for their sentences. Likewise, if the sentencing judge
relies upon such information to sentence defendants, 2 6 then the Bureau
of Prisons and other institutions within the criminal justice system could
use the relatively unreliable information to later punish, process, and treat
them.
To a significant degree, a defendant's sentence will be based on the
nature of the present crime and the extent of the prior record. 2 7
However, the remaining discretion surrounding the sentencing decision
and, more importantly, the correctional process will be based on
information contained in the PSIR, the VIS, and any diagnostic
opinions. '1 The need for reliable information is, therefore, much
greater. But the safeguards for assuring that the information is reliable are
far more limited than if the defendant had gone to trial.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
121. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 803 (setting forth 24 exceptions allowing the admission of
hearsay even though the declarant is available to testify at trial).

122. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
123. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967).
124. See FED. R. CIuM. P. 32(b)(3).
125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)-(7), (d)(10) (1994); Rosecrance, supranote 62, at
240-41,251-52. Rosecrance found that probation officers rely, to the exclusion of other
considerations, mainly on a defendant's prior record and present crime to arrive at a
sentence recommendation because "'[tihat's the way judges want it.'" Id. at 240; see
also Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 843.
128. See Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 844.
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V. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF PARTIAL DISCLOSURE OF THE
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT: THE
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Rule 32 now requires that the PSIR exclude what should be the
essence of a complete and accurate report: diagnostic opinions, sources of
confidential information, and any other information that might cause harm
to any person.'2 9 In addition, the court may, in its discretion, exclude
sentencing recommendations from the defendant. 30 Even as early as
1989, though, the Rule 32 advisory committee ironically expressed severe
misgivings about partial disclosure.' 3' The committee questioned "the
potential unfairness of having confidential or diagnostic material included
in presentence reports but not disclosed to a defendant who might be
adversely affected by such material."132 Moreover, the committee
concluded that "[i]nformation provided by confidential sources and
information posing a possible threat of harm to third parties was
particularly troubl[esome] . . .since this information is often extremely
negative and thus potentially harmful to a defendant." 33 But, without
offering any rationale, the committee determined "that it was preferable
to permit the probation officer to include this information in a report so
that the sentencing court may determine whether is [sic] ought to be
disclosed to the defendant."' 34
Although Rule 32 excludes diagnostic opinions and sources of
confidential or harmful information from full disclosure to the defendant,
Rule 32 permits judges, in their discretion, to disclose confidential
information to the defendant in writing if it will be relied upon for
sentencing. 13 Under Rule 32(c)(3)(A), if, at sentencing, a judge relies
on material that has been mandatorily excluded under Rule 32 (i.e.,
diagnostic opinions and sources of confidential or harmful
information),' 36 then that judge must summarize the material in writing,
129. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A)-(C).

130. FED. R. CpdM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
131. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 advisory committee's note (1989).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The committee stated, in essence, that a court's summarized disclosure to
the defendant of information relied upon for sentencing, and the due process concerns
that could arise, serve as an efficient doorstop to disallow a defendant from enjoying full
disclosure. Id.
135. FED. R. CRrM. P. 32(b)(5)(A)-(C).
136. FED. R. CPJM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
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"in lieu of making that [material or] information available"' 3 I to the
defendant. If judges in their discretion must make such information
available to the defendant (e.g., in the form of providing relevant
documents, such as psychiatric diagnostic reports), then the mandatory
exclusion of this information from PSIRs is unnecessary.
At a minimum, the mandatorily exbluded material should be included
in the PSIR. The initial inclusion of all material would require the
government to seek to exclude from the PSIR (before the PSIR is revealed
to the defendant) information over which the government, through its
witnesses and evidence, has exclusive knowledge and control. As Rule 32
now reads, defendants must seek disclosure of information that they might
not know about and over which they have no control.'
It is far more
efficient and equitable to require the party that is privy to information to
demonstrate that the information should be included in or excluded from
the PSIR. The party with access to information can best introduce
evidence that will prove a particular assertion regarding the information.
The party (i.e., the defendant) with no knowledge of particular
information has little ability (in any type of litigation) to make a reasoned
assertion about the information, which may be3 9summarized only on the
last day of trial litigation (i.e., the sentencing).
The information mandatorily excluded (diagnostic opinions and
sources of confidential or harmful information)"4 is extremely important
both during and beyond the correctional and treatment processes. 4 '
Information not relied upon for sentencing that still remains in the PSIR,
"excluded information" because of its importance and relevancy, is
transmitted to the Bureau of Prisons and social service agencies. 142 If
the sentencing judge does not rely on the excluded information, and thus
does not even summarize the information, 4 3 the defendant could be
placed in a difficult and ironic situation. Sentenced based on other
information, this hypothetical defendant will have never seen the excluded
information that actually determines part of his or her sentence: where the
defendant is incarcerated and what, if any, rehabilitation he or she
receives. In addition, he or she might not even know that the information
137. Id.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

FED. R. CalM. P. 32(b)(5)(A)-(C), (b)(6)(A)-(D).
See FED. R. CRaM. P. 32(b)(6)(D).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A)-(C).
See generally Findley & Ross, supra note 3.
See id. at 845.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
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exists, because Rule 32 places no requirement upon anyone to reveal the
existence of the damaging material.' 44
Thus, even if the information is not used to arrive at a sentence, the
Bureau of Prisons and social service agencies may use the information
contained in the PSIR to determine the type of prison (e.g., maximum or
minimum security) in which the defendant will be incarcerated. 45 In
addition, prison employment, prison transfers, visitation and mail
privileges, sentencing credit, work study, and physical and mental health
treatment may also be based upon the PSIR.'4 However, under Rule
32, the defendant will have had no opportunity to challenge the basis of
these types of decisions by nonjudicial agencies and institutions. 47
Indeed, under Rule 32, the defendant may not even know of the existence
of the information used to reach these decisions.' 48"
Moreover, it is unreasonable that defendant information important to
institutional agencies after sentencing would be excluded from the PSIR
during the sentencing process. 149 For example, diagnostic opinions
(should they ever be useful) and sources of confidential information might
be vital to the Bureau of Prisons to place the defendant in an appropriate
prison. For example, imagine that a psychiatrist has concluded that the
defendant is the most dangerous person alive. Additionally, a confidential
source has reported that the defendant plans to kill correctional officers if,
in doing so, he could escape from prison. Assuming this scenario, it
would be extremely dangerous to exclude this information from the PSIR,
or not transmit it throughout the justice system. However, if the
sentencing judge does not rely on such information, which will not be
contained in the PSIR, then governmental and social service agencies may
never gain access to such information. If the judge does not rely on the
information and somehow the Bureau of Prisons or other agencies gain
access to it, and thus use it to treat the defendant, the defendant will still
not have had an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the information.
If the information is relevant, however, the information is important to
society and should be made known to the criminal justice bureaucracy.
Because the criminal justice system needs information compiled about
a defendant, that information should, as a matter of common sense, be
fully evaluated. To make a fair evaluation of the information, all affected
parties must have access to it. Then, in an adversarial proceeding before
144. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 32.
145. See Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 841.
146. Id.
147. See FED. R. C~aM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
148. See FED. R. CiAM. P. 32(c)(1)-(3).
149. FED. R. CriM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
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the court, the information can be rejected, or adopted and used by the
defendant and the criminal justice system. Otherwise, the information
should not be allowed in the court to sentence the defendant, or to pave
with fool's gold the road the defendant walks upon after sentencing:
possible inaccurate information has no place in the criminal justice system.
Such "noncollection," with the accompanying loss of relevant information,
seems like a strange and ineffective remedy for the mandatory
nondisclosure in Rule 32150 of potentially important, relevant, and vital
information.
VI.

DEFENDANTS'

OBJECTIONS TO THE

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Generally, defendants' rights at sentencing are more limited than those
of defendants in any other judicial proceeding. With regard to PSIRs,
defendants must rely on the discretion of the sentencing judge acting
within the range of the sentencing guidelines.'
Diagnostic opinions
and sources of confidential or harmful information will be mandatorily
excluded from the PSIR,'52 and probation officers' sentencing
recommendations will be excluded at the court's discretion."' If the
court relies on the mandatorily excluded information at sentencing, then
"the court .. . must summarize [the information] in writing [and] . . .
give the defendant and the defendant's counsel a reasonable opportunity
to comment on that information."" 54 Rule 32 currently contains no
requirement that the court summarize probation officers' undisclosed
sentencing recommendations. 55
If the defendant repudiates information in the PSIR, the judge must (1)
make a finding as to whether he or she credits the controverted matter for
purposes of sentencing, or (2) make a determination that no finding is
necessary because the judge will not consider the contested information to
determine the defendant's sentence.' 56 Rule 32 requires that a written
record" (often a copy of the sentencing transcript'58 ) of the judge's
150. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A)-(C).

151. The sentencing guidelines enumerate the types and ranges of sentences for
various offenses committed by categories of defendants. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994

(1994).
152. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(5).

153. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
154. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
155. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 32.
156. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(c)(1).
157. Id.
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findings and determinations be appended to any copy of the PSIR that is

made available to the Bureau of Prisons.15 9

Although defendants have a Rule 32 right'" and a due process

right 6' to challenge allegedly inaccurate information contained in the
PSIR, defendants have no constitutional right to procedural safeguards
commonly guaranteed at trial, such as the right of confrontation and crossexamination. 6 Under Rule 32, the sentencing judge might limit the
defendant's challenge to a "comment" on controverted matters) 63
While sentencing judges must make findings regarding controverted

matters (or not rely on those matters in passing sentence'64), there are
no particular standards to guide judges in making their findings.'"

In

their discretion, judges may allow defendants to comment on the disputed

material (in accord with Rule 32), 66 or even allow the parties to
introduce evidence. 67 Although Rule 32 gives judges the discretion to
admit testimony, 68 the defendant has no right to a hearing in which to
challenge any disputed material in the PSIR, 169 especially if the
158. For purposes of transmitting the findings and determinations of the sentencing
judge to the Bureau of Prisons, one court of appeals approved a process by which the
United States Attorney's office sent a copy of the sentencing transcript to the Probation
Office instructing that the transcript be attached to the PSIR. United States v. Slaughter,
900 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990).
159. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1).

160. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
161. See United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987).
162. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding that due process is
not violated if a judge obtains out-of-court information for assistance to determine a
defendant's sentence).
163. FED. R. CtuM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).

164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Romano, 825 F.2d 725. InRomano, the sentencing judge disclaimed
reliance on the defendant's PSIR and used information from a previous trial in which the
defendant, who pleaded guilty, was precluded from testifying. Despite the defendant's
objections to information in the PSIR and the information gleaned from the related trial,
the court of appeals approved the sentencing judge's use of information from that
previous trial. Id.
166. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
167. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(1).

168. Id.
169. The defendant does not have the right to a "full blown" hearing. Romano, 825
F.2d. at 728; see also United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir.
1983) (concluding that the defendant may only have the right to comment upon disputed
material that the sentencing judge will consider). Charmer, however, is a decision
mitigated by subsequent amendments to Rule 32.
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sentencing judge does not consider the material in passing sentence. 170
The defendant, therefore, has virtually no procedurally
comphrehensive, adversarial method to ensure the correction of an
inaccurate PSIR, especially once the defendant is processed beyond the
actual day of sentencing. Under the 1994 amendment to Rule 32, judges
must now "verify that the defendant and defendant's counsel have read
and discussed the presentence report. "171 But this perfunctory inquiry
refers only to the PSIR submitted to the defendant thirty-five days before
sentencing, 172 a version of the PSIR upon which the defendant may
lodge objections with the probation officer." a Rule 32 does not require
any comparable judicial inquiry with regard to the revised version of the
PSIR, which must contain the probation officer's response to the
defendant's initial objections and be submitted to the defendant only seven
days before the sentencing hearing. 74
The defense must also bear significant responsibility for inaccurate
PSIRs: if the defendant's attorney does not fully realize the importance
of the PSIR, the attorney will not adequately challenge it. Rule 32
historically required no judicial inquiry into the defendant's understanding
of the PSIR. 175 In a salutary change, the 1994 amendment to Rule 32
required that judges "verify that the defendant and defendant's counsel
have read and discussed the presentence report. "176
While such a required inquiry should illustrate the importance of the
PSIR to the defense, the inquiry does not go very far to ensure the
accuracy of the PSIR. Before the 1994 amendment to Rule 32, appellate
courts almost unanimously concluded that sentencing judges need only
have determined that defendants and their attorneys had received the PSIR
and been given the opportunity to comment on it; judges did not have to
170. FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
171. Id.
172. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).

174. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(b)(6)(C). The addendum must contain any of the
defendant's unresolved objections, grounds for them, "and the probation officer's
comments on the objections." Id. Yet "the court may, at the hearing, accept the
presentence report as its findings of fact." FED. R. CraM. P. 32(b)(6)(D). Only the
unresolved objections communicated fourteen days prior to the hearing are excepted. See
FED. R. CIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
175. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee's notes.
176. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
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provide an adversarial hearing1n or inquire
into the defendant's
opportunity to read and discuss the PSIR.178 Now that Rule 32 requires
some judicial inquiry into the defendant's reading and discussion of the
PSIR that is received thirty-five days before sentencing17 1 (but not the
revised PSIR that is received at least seven days before sentencing),"m
it it unlikely that appellate courts will require further judicial inquiry into
defendant's understanding of the PSIR.
In stark contrast to the level of judicial participation during
sentencing, judges must make searching inquiries and hold hearings before

accepting guilty pleas' 8' or admissions of confessions."n

Judges must

be sure that guilty pleas are made voluntarily1 " and that the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was waived validly."8
However, unlike at a pretrial hearing or trial, if at sentencing a defendant
contests the accuracy of an allegation in a revised PSIR (which he or she

might not receive until only seven days before sentencingm), the
defendant must prove the inaccuracy, in many cases by a preponderance
177. See, e.g., United States v. Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that an adversarial hearing may be provided at the discretion of the trial
judge); United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
judge's decision "to deny a request for an evidentiary hearing on alleged inaccuracies in
a presentence report must be reviewed for abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1040 (1989).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 880 F.2d 243, 245 (9th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that Rule 32 "does not require the court to directly address a defendant
concerning his knowledge of the presentence report"); United States v. Sambino, 799
F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that "[i]t is not necessary for the district court
to personally question the defendant as to whether he has read the [PSIR]"). But see
United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring the judge to ask
the defendant whether he or she (1) has read the PSIR, (2) has discussed it with the
defense attorney, or (3) wishes to contest any facts in the PSIR).
179. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
180. FED. R. CIUM. P. 32(b)(6)(D).
181. See, e.g., FED. R. CaIM. P. 11 (plea agreements).
182. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (holding that a judge must
determine whether, and find that, a defendant's confession was voluntarily given before
it can be submitted to a jury).
183. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding that a defendant must
voluntarily plead guilty and understand the implications of his or her guilty plea).
184. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that suspects must be
informed of and voluntarily waive their Fifth Amendment protections before their
statements will be admissible in court).
185. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(C).
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of the evidence." 8 In contrast, at a pretrial hearing, the prosecution
must prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the
evidence;187 the prosecution must prove every element of a crime beyond
a reasonable doubt at trial."
At sentencing, the defendant, in high
contrast to the entrenched procedures for pre-trial and trial hearings that
ensure fairness and accuracy, does not have a comparable ability to ensure
an accurate PSIR.
Another problem for the defendant is that it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to produce any evidence or sustain any burden of persuasion
(even one based on a preponderance of the evidence, the lowest burden of
persuasion) because he or she will most likely be in jail awaiting
sentencing. Under Rule 32, the names of persons obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality 89 must not be contained in the PSIR and, at
the judge's discretion, may never be disclosed to the defendant. It
follows, then, that the person who made such statements may never be
known to the defendant. In reality, the incarcerated defendant will have
almost no ability to investigate the statements, if the judge ever discloses
them. If the judge does, however, disclose them, the disclosure could
only take the form of a written summary on the day of sentencing. 9 '
In the event that sufficient resources are available, defense attorneys, who
may be heavily burdened and unable to completely read the PSIR before
the day of sentencing, will unlikely conduct a full investigation. In
186. See, e.g., United States v. Ratlif, 999 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that to prove a due process violation based on an inaccurate PSIR "the defendant
must raise grave doubt as to the veracity of the information and show that the court
relied on that false information in determining the sentence") (quoting United States v.
Fry, 831 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 1987)); United States v. Gracia, 983 F.2d 625, 630
(5th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[a] defendant challenging information presented at
sentencing bears the burden of demonstrating its untruth, inaccuracy, or unreliability");
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1513 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the
judge at sentencing may consider even "second hand" hearsay in PSIRs if the hearsay
has "'sufficient or minimally adequate' indicia of reliability"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1595 (1993); see also United States v. Sustaita, 1 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1993);
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the preponderance of the
evidence standard governing findings at sentencing meets due process requirements). But
see United States v. Fetlow, 21 F.3d 243 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the disputed statements in a PSIR if a
judge is to rely upon them for sentencing).
187. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (holding that a trial judge must find
that the government proved only by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's
confession was voluntary before submitting it to a jury).
188. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
190. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
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addition, what defense attorneys might consider to be insignificant errors

not worthy of contesting may very well be important to the defendant
during or after sentencing. Under these circumstances, it would be
impossible for a defendant to disprove the erroneous allegations and
information contained in the PSIR or challenge information excluded from

it.
VII. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO INACCURATE INFORMATION
When a defendant alleges that a PSIR contains inaccurate information,
the sentencing judge must exercise one of three alternatives under Rule

32.1'

First, the judge may make a "finding" that the information is,

indeed, inaccurate. In this instance, the inaccurate information will not
harm the defendant because the judge will not rely on it in sentencing, and
a copy of the judge's findings regarding the inaccuracy, usually the
sentencing transcript,"g will accompany the PSIR made available to the
Bureau of Prisons. 193

Second, the judge may find that the contested information is accurate.
In this instance, the defendant has little recourse because the judge is
under no obligation to thoroughly evaluate the information contained in the
PSIR, even though the judge could"9 and perhaps should order a
hearing. 9 Nonetheless, the defendant has no right to a "full-blown
evidentiary hearing at sentencing
. 196
191. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(1).
192. See United States v. Slaughter, 900 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating that submission of a sentencing transcript is "a common and acceptable method
of discharging [the writing] requirement of Rule 32"). With regard to controverted
material, some form of written finding is required, and the finding must be conveyed to
the Bureau of Prisons in an appendix to the PSIR. FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(c)(1). See also
United States v. Conkins, 9 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring written findings with
regard to the ending date of a drug conspiracy).
193. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(1). The sentencing judge can adopt the PSIR to satisfy
the requirement of a finding, United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225 (5th Cir. 1994),
but, with the 1994 amendment to Rule 32, only with regard to uncontested matters.
FED. R. CPIM. P. 32(b)(6)(D).
194. See FED. R. CRnM. P. 32(c)(1) (stating that "[tihe court... may permit the
parties to introduce testimony or other evidence on the objections").
195. See United States v. Cifuentes, 863 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that
a defendant is entitled to a hearing to contest disputed information, if the sentencing
judge relied on the information in imposing sentence).
196. United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987). A judge's
decision to deny completely an evidentiary hearing will be reversed only if the judge
abused her or his discretion, an extremely difficult standard for a defendant to prove.
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Theoretically, the defendant could appeal the judge's finding, but he
or she would be without an actual remedy. If the judge's finding is based
on a hearing, it is extremely unlikely that any appellate court would
substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the sentencing judge. "I
If the judge does not hold a hearing, the defendant has little recourse
because Rule 32, while authorizing a hearing, does not require a
hearing.' 98 Moreover, under Rule 32, if the defendant does not make
a proper and timely objection to the PSIR,'11 the court may accept the
PSIR as its findings of fact.' ° Therefore, if the defendant's attorney is
not especially vigilant in reading the PSIR and discussing it in detail with
the defendant, the defendant could suffer unnecessarily with an inaccurate
PSIR.
Under the third alternative, Rule 32 permits the judge to determine
that a "finding" is not necessary as to controverted information, if the
judge will not rely upon the controverted information at sentencing. 0 '
Even where the judge does not rely on the controverted information, the
defendant, in almost all cases, is not entitled to have the information
excised from the PSIR.?
The defendant will have to challenge any
inaccuracies through administrative procedures.3
Furthermore, a judge's decision not to make a finding about possible
inaccurate information in the PSIR can have grave implications for the
defendant in the correctional process. For example, the lack of a finding
(regarding alleged inaccuracies) by the sentencing judge under Rule 32 has
permitted governmental agencies extraordinary discretion in using
controverted material, to the defendant's detriment.Y In Coleman v.
United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1040 (1989).
197. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983) (concluding that "it is not
the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court

as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence").
198. FED.
199. FED.
200. FED.
201. FED.

R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1).
R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(D).
R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(1).

202. See United States v. Legrano, 659 F.2d 17, 18 (4th Cir. 1981). The Legrano
court did say, however, that the defendant could challenge any contested information
through "administrative avenues." Id.
203. Id.

204. See, e.g., Bayless v. United States, 14 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 1994); Blue v. Lacy,
857 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1988); Ochoau v. United States, 819 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1987);
Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, reh'g granted, 806 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1986). In each
of these cases, the court permitted or would permit the Parole Commission (before its
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Honsted,2°5 the defendant challenged an allegation in the PSIR that his

offense involved more than 15 kilograms of cocaine.

The Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Parole Commission could
credit and rely on the challenged information (which was extremely
damaging to an early parole determination) because the sentencing judge
In Coleman, the Parole
had expressly disregarded the information.'
Commission (although it could be any governmental agency, such as the
Federal Bureau of Prisons or the states' Departments of Corrections) was
permitted to make its own factual findings about disputed portions of the

presentence investigation report. 2°

Similarly, in Lewis v. Beeler,' where a defendant was charged
with and convicted only of extortion, the sentencing judge stated that there
was not a "shred of evidence" to support a prosecutor's suggestion at

sentencing that the defendant was guilty of murders committed by placing
cyanide in Tylenol."' However, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the Parole Commission's determination that the defendant
had committed the seven "Tylenol murders." 2 ' The court concluded

that the Parole Commission was entitled to make its own findings and thus
deny parole, because the sentencing judge had not made a finding within
the meaning of Rule 32.2"2
After sentencing, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to correct the

PSIR.213 After the actual sentence, courts do not have jurisdiction under

abolition) to credit and use against a defendant information in a PSIR that had been
disregarded by the sentencing judge. See also Vitk v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)
(concluding that a decision by a state Department of Correctional Services to transfer the
defendant/inmate from prison to a mental health facility implicated a due process liberty
interest and could be implemented only after an adversary hearing).
205. 908 F.2d 906 (l1th Cir. 1990).
206. Id. at 907.
207. Id. at 907-08.
208. Id.
209. 949 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1972 (1992).
210. Id. at 327.
211. Id. at 331-32. See also United States v. Beatty, 9 F.3d 686, 689 (8th Cir.
1993) (concluding that the PSIR need not be amended to exclude an allegation that the
defendant was the main suspect in an uncharged murder).
212. Lewis, 949 F.2d at 331.
213. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 875. Appellate courts will look to determine
only whether the sentencing judge complied with the formal requirements of Rule 32.
Id. See also United States v. Lawal, 810 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1987) (remanding for
resentencing because the sentencing judge did not clearly indicate, through a finding or
determination, whether he relied on disputed material in the PSIR); United States v.
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Rule 32 to correct the PSIR.214 Thus, the lack of a judge's finding as
to controverted information in the PSIR may permit all other criminal
justice agencies to reach their own conclusions regarding the controverted
information. For example, at an administrative hearing, a defendant will
have no right to an appointed attorney in contesting a transfer from a
prison to a mental health facility so long as he or she is provided with

qualified and independent assistance.215

Even in probation or parole

revocation proceedings, the defendant has no absolute right to an
appointed attorney,2 16 although Congress had provided counsel in parole
revocation proceedings at the discretion of the court to serve the interests
of justice.217 Especially in the federal system, where the relatively few
prisons are scattered throughout the country, the defendant may be
Eschweiler, 782 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring a specific finding on disputed
matter unless the sentencing judge indicates clearly in a written determination that he or
she will not rely on the disputed matter); United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.
1984) (requiring reasonable access to the PSIR and a judicial inquiry into whether the
defendant (1) read the PSIR, (2) discussed the PSIR with her or his attorney, or (3)
wishes to challenge the PSIR).
214. See United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287 (10th Cir. 1994).
215. See Vitk v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980) (concluding that a transfer
from a prison to a mental health facility implicated an inmate's due process liberty
interest entitling him to an adversary hearing, but concluding that an appointed attorney
was not required).
216. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,790 (1973) (requiring a hearing before
probation revocation but not mandating the appointment of an attorney except "on a caseby-case basis" to ensure "fundamental fairness"); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 487-89 (1972) (concluding that due process requires a hearing before parole
revocation but not deciding whether the appointment of an attorney is required). In
Gagnon, the Court used its prior holding in Morrissey to conclude that parole revocation
hearings and processes apply to probation revocation. 411 U.S. at 782. The Gagnon
Court further stated that the appointment of an attorney in both parole and probation
hearings must be made on a case-by-case basis, "[a]lthough the presence and
participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally
unnecessary in most revocation hearings .... ." Id. at 790. See Black v. Romano, 471
U.S. 606, 612 (1985) (concluding that "the probationer has a right to the assistance of
counsel in some circumstances"). With the abolition of parole, hearings regarding parole
revocation no longer exist; nonetheless, in the probation context, when a defendant is
charged with a probation violation, Congress has provided the indigent defendant with
the right to an attorney. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(C) (1994).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a), (g) (1994). With the abolition of parole, this section
was amended to delete any reference to parole revocation, effective November 1, 1997.
Pub. L. 98-473, tit. I, §§ 223(e)(2), 235, 98 Stat. 2028, 2031 (1984). Parole revocation
proceedings were governed by 18 U.S.C. § 4214 (repealed, effective Nov. 1, 1997, by
Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031 (1984)).
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imprisoned hundreds or thousands of miles away from the place of trial.
As Findley and Ross noted:
A defendant who wishes to have his or her PSI[R] corrected thus
faces a procedural nightmare. At the sentencing hearing, the
defendant can attempt to challenge information that is "irrelevant"
to sentencing, but he or she will probably find the challenge
dismissed upon the court's statement of nonreliance [on the
controverted information]. If, however, the defendant does not
raise the objection at sentencing, he or she may find that any later
challenge has been waived .... Attempts to correct PSI[R]s after
sentencing through direct appeals, "Rule 32 motions," Rule 35
motions [correction of sentence], or section 2255 motions [habeas
corpus] have more often than not been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.218
The defendant will be haunted by an inaccurate PSIR. He or she will
stand alone in the abyss of a prison to confront and attempt to refute a
document, prepared years earlier, that an untutored defendant may not be
able to read, let alone comprehend. The lack of procedural safeguards
inherent in Rule 32 will unfairly burden and punish a defendant far beyond
the day of sentencing.

VIII. THE NEED FOR WIDER DISCLOSURE AND
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

Even with its many amendments, Rule 32 still contains structural
impediments that lead unnecessarily to inaccurate PSIRs and unfairness in
the sentencing and correctional processes. For example, under Rule 32,
a judge does not have to summarize undisclosed information if the
information will not be relied upon at sentencing. '9 A study, conducted
prior to the current Rule 32, found that even when judges chose to
summarize undisclosed information, "43.3% [of the judges] do not
adequately summarize undisclosed information relied upon in sentencing
. . .."I The inadequate summaries by the judges, as well as the
failure of many probation officers to communicate the nature of the
confidential information withheld from the defendant, create situations
where correctional authorities cannot act in a manner consistent with
218. Findley & Ross, supra note 3, at 878.
219. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
220. Fennell & Hall, supra note 3, at 1663.
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judge's sentencing decisions.221 Furthermore, there is little evidence that
judge's summaries under more recent versions of Rule 32 better prevent
arbitrary and improper treatment of defendants.m At the sentencing
hearing, even if the defendant could effectively challenge disputed
summarized information contained in the PSIR, Fennell and Hall found
that "less than one-fourth of the district courts . . communicate to the
correctional agencies the defendant's challenges to information in the
presentence report and the resolution of these challenges."'
This
conclusion was made before the 1983 amendment to Rule 32 required
transmittal of judge's findings and determinations to the Bureau of
Prisons.'4 However, the low rate of transmittal (less than twenty-five
percent) existed despite an explicit policy of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts to correct errors in the PSIR.
The
Administrative Office had directed that "information in the presentence
investigation report determined to be factually inaccurate by the court shall
be corrected by rewriting those pages which include the error(s)."26 In
addition, long before the Rule 32 disclosure requirements, at least one
227
court of appeals, in United States v. Picard,
mandated disclosure of
the substance of a presentence report.'
Thus, despite the recent
amendments to Rule 32, it is virtually certain that the Bureau of Prisons
and social service agencies will continue to base critical decisions
concerning an inmate on inaccurate and incomplete information contained
in or excluded from PSIRs.
Inaccuracies in PSIRs do not necessarily result from a lack of
diligence by probation officers, intentional misrepresentations by persons
the probation officers interview, or shoddy record-keeping by
governmental agencies. Preparing a PSIR involves a nonadversarial
221. Id. at 1681.
222. See Lewis v. Beeler, 949 F.2d 325, 330-31 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
a finding does not exist even where a judge at sentencing concludes that there is not a

"shred of evidence" to show that the defendant committed the murders alleged in the

PSIR, thus permitting the Parole Commission to make its own findings regarding
controverted material in the PSIR), cert. denied, 112 U.S. 1972 (1992); see also United
States v. Tunstall, 17 F.3d 245 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a finding is not necessary

where a court does not rely on disputed information in sentencing).
223. Fennell & Hall, supra note 3, at 1680.

224. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) (1983).
225.

ADMIN. OFF. OF THE

U.S. CTs., supra note 5, at 15d.

226. Id.
227. 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972).
228. Id. at 220 (vacating the defendant's sentence because the trial court refused to
disclose a portion of the PSIR that was used to pass sentence).
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process. The process is unlike a trial where every fact may be challenged
and every witness cross-examined. The preparation of the PSIR manifests
broader societal considerations that involve victims and their families,
Probation officers'
defendants, courts, and correctional agencies.
assessments and factual compilations probably will not be confronted with
the same rigor and intensity as they would be at an adversarial proceeding.
However, even assuming good faith efforts by everyone involved in
the preparation of the PSIR, the report will reflect some errors, if only
those of perception. For example, if not clarified and explained, a report
about a prior arrest or conviction may not truly reflect a defendant's
culpability. That is, some prosecutors, even United States Attorneys
acting under one federal attorney general, may demand that a defendant
plead guilty to the highest possible count for a particular action. Despite
institutional guidelines, other prosecutors may routinely agree to a
misdemeanor or lower felony plea for the same action. Offenses in urban
areas may be characterized far differently than they are in rural areas.
These discretionary disparities prevent the characterization of an action
(e.g., felony, misdemeanor, infraction, or violation) from accurately
depicting a defendant's culpability.
To prevent defendants from being sentenced and treated on the basis
of inaccurate information in PSIRs, Rule 32 needs structural tinkering and
the criminal justice system's approach to the sentencing hearing needs a
complete overhaul. The sentencing hearing is at least as important as a
pretrial hearing conducted to determine the admissibility of a defendant's
statement to law enforcement personnelP 9 or the propriety of law
At a pretrial hearing, the
enforcement's seizure of evidence. 3"
safeguards available
procedural
same
the
of
many
exercise
may
defendant
at trial. At trial, the defendant may confront and cross-examine
witnesses,"1 call the defendant's own witnesses, 1 2 subpoena hostile
witnesses ,233 and challenge the sufficiency and basis of the legal
document-whether indictment or information-lodged against the
229. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring a hearing to
determine whether a defendant has waived the right to remain silent).
230. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (vacating the conviction
pending a hearing to determine the propriety of identification procedures).
231. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (guaranteeing an adequate

opportunity for cross-examination at trial).
232. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that a defendant,
under certain circumstances, has a due process right to cross-examine his own witness
and elicit relevant hearsay, despite rules of evidence to the contrary).
233. See FED. R. CPiM. P. 17(a) (providing for the compulsory appearance of
witnesses); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (guaranteeing compulsory process
of an alleged co-participant in a crime, despite rules of evidence to the contrary).
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defendant.'
Moreover, at pretrial hearings and trials, the prosecution
bears both the burden of production and persuasion with regard to proving
the admissibility of confessions and other evidence, as well as the elements
of a crime.
The PSIR is often as important as an indictment. Simply, the PSIR
may affect significantly a defendant's time in prison, security level, and
type of societal supervision upon release from prison. Yet, under Rule
32, the defendant may only "object" to the alleged inaccuracies in the
PSIR236 or "comment" on the judge's summaries of undisclosed portions
of the PSIR. 7
Moreover, with one exception, 8 courts have
uniformly rejected any right at sentencing to procedural safeguards based
on the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 9
Thus, any
additional safeguards will probably have to be ensured under statutory or
rulemaking authority.
The process of correcting inaccurate PSIRs and ensuring fairness in
sentencing must first be viewed broadly. The process will involve
educating defense attorneys, who often view their role as complete once
a finding as to guilt has been made, and judges, who may be reluctant to
use courtroom time to make factual determinations about disputed issues
arising from the contents of the PSIR or the summaries of information
excluded from the PSIR. Defense attorneys might become more involved
in the preparation of accurate PSIRs once they realize that doing so will
further their client's interests. Both trial and appellate courts should
realize that greater disclosure of information will provide more accurate
PSIRs; permit the imposition of more appropriate sentences; decrease the
amount of fact-finding at sentencing hearings (under a Rule 32 that
guarantees a type of pretrial procedural protection); minimize the number
of appellate issues in a relatively heavily and unnecessarily litigated area;
and yield more effective and fairer decisions by members of the criminal
justice system.
234. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), the defendant may challenge the indictment

or information by filing a proper motion.
235. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
236. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B), (c)(1).
237. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
238. See United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 104 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a right of confrontation is necessary at sentencing where the PSIR contained "triple

hearsay"). In Fortier,an informant told a Drug Enforcement Agency agent that a third
person said that drugs at issue belonged to the defendant. Id. at 103. But see United

States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1514 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the Fortiercourt's
"triple hearsay" analysis), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993).
239. See Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1514 (concluding that trial-like procedural

protections at sentencing are not constitutionally required).
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IX. AMENDING RULE 32 TO CREATE MORE
EFFECTIVE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

Under Rule 32, disclosure of the original PSIR must occur at least
But PSIRs revised upon the
thirty-five days before sentencing. 2'
objection of the defendant or the prosecution need be disclosed only seven
days prior to sentencing.241 Disclosure of the revised PSIR seven days
prior to sentencing is far too short a time in which to prepare for a current
or expanded Rule 32 sentencing hearing, especially if the revision, which
the government may request, adversely affects the defendant. Although
the seven days would be computed as "business," not calendar days,242
this time period would be especially inadequate for a sentencing hearing
that is procedurally similar to a pretrial hearing. At a minimum, partly
because of long trial delays, defendants have months, perhaps even a year
or more, to prepare for pretrial hearings. In comparison, seven business
days in which to prepare for a sentencing hearing is insufficient.
Earlier disclosure of the original and revised PSIR to the defendant
and the defense attorney would allow more adequate preparation for a
sentencing hearing. The need for earlier disclosure of the PSIR might
vary with every case, depending on the nature of the offense and the
social and criminal history of the defendant. For example, the PSIR might
be less detailed and thus require shorter analysis in a case where a single
defendant with no criminal record is found guilty of failing to report
income for tax purposes. In more complicated cases, such as those
involving far ranging conspiracies, a particular defendant's culpability
would have to be evaluated by determining his or her role in the
conspiracy, a sometimes complicated task that might require a more
detailed PSIR and a lengthy sentencing hearing.
Although determining how much time a defendant needs to examine
the PSIR and prepare for a sentencing hearing is relatively arbitrary, it is
no more so than determining when, for example, the prosecution must
release pretrial discovery to the defendant. In the federal courts, at the
request of the defendant, the prosecution must reveal any discoverable
evidence.243 Given that the arraignment and trial can be months,
perhaps a year, apart, no one would argue that the prosecution could
release discoverable evidence only seven days before trial or a pretrial
hearing. In practice, discoverable evidence is released months before
trial.
240. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
241. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(C).
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(a).
243. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
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Similarly, it is not reasonable to release the revised PSIR only seven
business days before sentencing. A defendant's need to prepare is exactly
the same, whether for pretrial proceedings, the trial, or the sentencing
hearing. The rationale behind the early disclosure of information in the
PSIR remains the same: defendants need relevant information and a
sufficient opportunity to prepare a defense.
Therefore, the original PSIR should be released at least sixty days
before the sentencing hearing, and any revised report should be released
at least thirty days before the sentencing hearing. Under the federal rules,
the thirty day period would translate into only about twenty-two business
days. 2 " While it continues in existence, the Parole Commission is
statutorily required to provide the PSIR to incarcerated defendants at least
thirty days prior to a parole hearing.245 This extra time would allow the
defendant and the defense attorney the opportunity to put aside other
duties or cases and schedule interviews with relevant persons and conduct
a thorough investigation. Although time served in a local jail is probably
more uncomfortable than time served in a federal prison, the defendant
would not be harmed in terms of the length of her or his sentence, because
the time spent incarcerated prior to trial and sentencing would be credited
toward the defendant's ultimate sentence. 246
Assuming earlier disclosure, after reviewing the PSIR, the defendant
may find factual errors, misleading perceptions, or improper conclusions,
all of which can be investigated by both the defense and the probation
officer. The 1994 amendment to Rule 32 already amounts to a significant
improvement. Now, even before sentencing, the defendant may raise with
the probation officer objections to the PSIR.247 The probation officer
may more thoroughly investigate particular objections and report revised
conclusions to the judge in a revised PSIR,2 " which the judge may use
as findings of fact.249 The defendant's assertions can thereby be verified
or discounted. The probation officer may even verify a fact that the
defendant alleged to be false.
244. FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(a). In computing a period of time, holiday and weekend

days are counted in computing time, unless the prescribed time period is less than eleven
days. Id.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (1994) (repealed, effective Nov. 1, 1997, by Pub. L. 98473, tit. II, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031 (1984)). See supra note 217 for a
statutory history of the abolition of parole.
246. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1994). A prisoner may also be credited with 54 days
per year toward service of her or his sentence for satisfactory behavior; a period
commonly termed "good time." Id.
247. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
248. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(C).
249. FED. R. CruM. P. 32(b)(6)(D).
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From the prosecution's point of view, if the PSIR is completed and
released sufficiently prior to the sentencing hearing, defendants will be put
on notice that their versions of a particular fact or event probably will be
discounted, unless evidence to the contrary is presented at the sentencing
hearing. If the defense does not properly object to the PSIR, then the
defendant will waive any further right to challenge it."
Finally, Rule 32 should be amended so that all information used to
assess the defendant, including sentencing recommendations,"'
diagnostic opinions," and confidential information,' 3 be revealed to
the defendant. Of course, the one exception to the rule relates to
information that if revealed "might result in harm, physical or otherwise,
This provision should always be
to the defendant or other persons."'
read not to permit disclosure if the release of information creates a
reasonable possibility that physical harm to the defendant or another
person might result. Otherwise, especially with regard to possible
"mental" harm, which is not explicitly mentioned in Rule 32, this
provision should be read narrowly. Rule 32's reference to harm, physical
"or otherwise," is so broad that presumably it could cover mental harm.
As noted in Section IV above, there are few persons likely to be
harmed by the disclosure to the defendant of information in the PSIR or
information now excluded from it under Rule 32. However, the
disclosure exclusion provision, as now written, is so broad that there is no
criterion a judge can use to determine what is "harm" to a defendant.
Harm would obviously include suicide, but it seems highly unlikely that
the information contained in a PSIR or excluded from it would cause the
defendant to commit suicide after he or she has weathered a finding of
guilt as to a criminal offense.
Moreover, judges, as well as others involved in the proceedings, are
ill trained to determine exactly what in a PSIR, or excluded from the
PSIR, could cause harm to a defendant. One study in particular showed
that no one, including the psychiatrists, can agree on criteria by which to
250. See United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 924-25 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the defendant waived a challenge to the PSIR where the defense attorney did not raise

an alleged error regarding a prior conviction and where the defense attorney and the
defendant attested to the accuracy of the PSIR).
251. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
252. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
253. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(b)(5)(B).
254. FED. R. CIM. P. 32(b)(5)(C).
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evaluate dangerousness.355 Furthermore, another study showed that
dangerousness is nearly impossible to predict. 6 Therefore, it is
virtually absurd to advocate uniform standards of dangerousness if,
ultimately, it is impossible to predict dangerousness. Yet, in a quest for
fairness, some uniform standards must be developed if countries continue
to use danger and harm as legal criteria.
Similarly, diagnostic opinions should be routinely revealed to the
defendant, not automatically concealed. Although Rule 32 mandates
exclusion of "diagnostic opinions that . . . might seriously disrupt a
program of rehabilitation,"'
it is difficult to imagine what those
opinions are. Assume, for example, that a psychiatrist's opinion is as
detrimental as possible to a defendant. The psychiatrist writes that "the
defendant is the most dangerous person alive and should never be released
from prison." If a psychiatrist could predict dangerousness, which is
highly unlikely, 8 the defendant necessarily has been convicted already
of heinous crimes and will probably never be released from prison
anyway. If the diagnostic opinion could spur the defendant to harm the
psychiatrist or anyone else, then under the broad "harm exception" 9
the diagnostic opinion would never be disclosed to the defendant in the
first place.
Moreover, the Rule 32 mandatory diagnostic exclusion defies reason,
research, and professional opinion. Clients or patients should develop
trust and open communication with their counselors and others who
influence their lives.' ° The Rule 32 diagnostic exclusion, however,
255. See Harding & Adseballe, supra note 73, at 394-98. Legal definitions of
dangerousness lack clarity and precision. Id. at 394. Though psychiatrists are more
likely to rate a patient as dangerous, psychiatrists are no more likely than other
professionals to agree on a standard of dangerousness. Id. at 397. "[P]sychiatric
expertise does not increase the reliability of [dangerousness] ratings." Id. at 398.
256. Menzies, supranote 72, at 24 (concluding that "danger, violence, risk, [and]
psychopathy" are not amenable to scientific calibration). See SHEA, supra note 74, at
136 (concluding that psychiatrists cannot predict dangerousness).
257. FED. R. CPim. P. 32(b)(5)(A).
258. See generally Harding & Adseballe, supra note 73; SHEA, supra note 74, at
131-36.
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(C).
260. See WILLIAM A. DONOHUE with ROBERT KOLT, MANAGING INTERPERSONAL
CONFLICT 29 (1992); DAVID LESTER & MICHAEL BRASWELL, CORRECTIONAL
COUNSELING 3 (1987); BRUCE SHERTZER & SHELLY C. STONE, FUNDAMENTALS OF
COUNSELING 102-10 (1968); ROBERT J. WICKS, CORRECTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES

AND PROBLEMS IN CORRECTING THE OFFENDER 71 (1974); Charles L. Newman,
Concepts of Treatment in Probation and Parole Supervision, in READINGS IN
CORRECTIONAL CASEWORK AND COUNSELING 61, 63 (Edward E. Peoples ed., 1975).
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promotes suspicion and the withholding of honest communication. Both
Rule 32's mandate and judges' speculative conclusions that diagnostic
opinions should not be revealed to defendants would prevent some
defendants, such as sex offenders, from obtaining proper treatment.
Without proper treatment, which arguably might "cure" or "rehabilitate"
certain defendants (although rehabilitation is no longer a primary
correctional goal at the federal level'), defendants will have far fewer
chances for any type of success while in prison or after release. If a
treatment plan and its expectations are unknown, then a defendant cannot
work to change dysfunctional behavior.' z
With particular regard to Rule 32 and the PSIR, if erroneous
diagnostic opinions are not disclosed to the defendant, then the defendant
cannot challenge the inaccuracies with his or her expert witnesses. It
would be unthinkable in an insanity trial to permit the prosecution, but not
the defendant, to hire a psychiatrist. If the Rule 32 diagnostic exclusion
prevailed at trial, then neither the defendant nor the defendant's attorney
would be permitted to hear the prosecution's psychiatrist testify before the
jury. The judge would only summarize the psychiatrist's testimony. In
an adversarial system, it is illogical and unfair to deny a defendant the
opportunity to confront and refute, if possible, a diagnostic opinion.2 3
"The holistic approach to offender rehabilitation requires that each
offender receive a thorough diagnosis of his problems, and that an
appropriate control and rehabilitation plan be developed with the offender
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (1994) (declaring that the purpose of a
sentence is to punish criminals, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from
further crimes, while providing the defendant with needed training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment).
262. Virtually all problems and concerns may be more effectively confronted
through open communication. See LESTER & BRASWELL, supra note 260; Newman,
supra note 260.
263. Rule 32 also places mental health professionals in an irresolvable quandry. For
example, ethically, psychologists must insure that their tests are not misused by others.
See Ellsworth A. Fersch, Jr., Ethical Issuesfor Psychologists in Court Settings, in WHO
IS THE CLIENT:

THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IN THE CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM 43, 50-52 (John Monahan ed., 1980). However, psychologists have
responsibilities to both their clients and to the courts. An ethically tenuous situation may
arise because the psychologists' loyalties may be divided and undefined. They may be
tempted to create accurate but superficial reports and evaluations so as to prevent
untrained judges, lawyers, and probation officers from misinterpreting or misusing data
that may never be revealed to the defendant, the one to whom a psychologist presumably
owes the most allegiance.
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and carried through."'
It is the duty of a forensic psychiatrist to
moderate punishment and to recommend leniency if at all possible,26 5 yet
the sciences of psychiatry and psychology are more likely to be used by
federal courts to increase punishment.'
X. CONCLUSION: FULLER DISCLOSURE WILL CREATE
TRUST IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The restrictions that Rule 32 places on the defendant with regard to
the presentence investigation report would be inconceivable if applied to
pretrial or trial proceedings. Yet the sentencing hearing is at least as
important as pretrial hearings and sometimes more important than a
verdict of guilty or a plea of guilt. Rule 32 should be amended to create
earlier and more open disclosure of the PSIR, including material
(diagnostic opinions and confidential information) that is now
automatically excluded from the PSIR.
The procedure by which to correct information in the PSIR should be
more adversarial, thus minimizing the possibility that an isolated but
significant error will infect the entire PSIR and the correctional process.
Ultimately, however, the procedure might become even more cooperative
than it is now. The probation officer's fact gathering process would retain
a broad, utilitarian, and neutral perspective because no probation officer
wants to harm a defendant through an inaccurate PSIR. The judge's role
would remain the same. The judge's time spent at an expanded sentencing
hearing would not be significantly increased because many errors now
contested at sentencing would be corrected before sentencing. Having
worked cooperatively with the probation officer to correct errors before
sentencing, the defendant would be less likely to object to the PSIR at
sentencing.
Greater accuracy and efficiency would be fostered throughout the
remainder of the correctional process. While the net gain in efficiency
264. Leonard J. Hippchen, Fundamental Principles to a Holistic Approach, in
HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO OFFENDER REHABILITATION 5, 21 (Leonard J. Hippchen ed.,

1982).

265. See, Campbell, supranote 63, at 96. Forensic psychiatry developed as a tool
to aid in an offender's rehabilitation. Id. at 89. With the societal rejection of
rehabilitation as a correctional goal, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (1994), psychiatry
and psychology are now used by courts to justify punishment, a role for which they were
not designed and are poorly suited.
266. See Campbell, supra note 63, at 105-06. Campbell reviewed the use of
psychiatric presentence reports around the world, and concluded that judges are likely
to accept recommendations for severe punishment but unlikely to accept
recommendations for lenient punishment or treatment. Id.
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would be notable, most importantly, the defendant would be treated on the
basis of more reliable information. Used by competent correctional
officials, this information would only serve to enhance the sentencing and
correctional processes, not only for the defendant, but also for victims and
the public. If people believe the criminal justice system to be fair and
reliable, they will assume a more prominent role in its administration. If
defendants believe the criminal justice system to be fair and reliable, they
will be more likely to accept their fate and seek to change themselves.

